@article{allcottPolarizationPublicHealth2020,
  title = {Polarization and Public Health: {{Partisan}} Differences in Social Distancing during the Coronavirus Pandemic},
  shorttitle = {Polarization and Public Health},
  author = {Allcott, Hunt and Boxell, Levi and Conway, Jacob and Gentzkow, Matthew and Thaler, Michael and Yang, David},
  year = {2020},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {191},
  pages = {104254},
  issn = {00472727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104254},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {We study partisan differences in Americans' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Political leaders and media outlets on the right and left have sent divergent messages about the severity of the crisis, which could impact the extent to which Republicans and Democrats engage in social distancing and other efforts to reduce disease transmission. We develop a simple model of a pandemic response with heterogeneous agents that clarifies the causes and consequences of heterogeneous responses. We use location data from a large sample of smartphones to show that areas with more Republicans engaged in less social distancing, controlling for other factors including public policies, population density, and local COVID cases and deaths. We then present new survey evidence of significant gaps at the individual level between Republicans and Democrats in self-reported social distancing, beliefs about personal COVID risk, and beliefs about the future severity of the pandemic.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/1-s2.0-S0047272720301183-main.pdf}
}

@article{allcottSocialMediaFake2017,
  title = {Social {{Media}} and {{Fake News}} in the 2016 {{Election}}},
  author = {Allcott, Hunt and Gentzkow, Matthew},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {31},
  number = {2},
  pages = {211--236},
  issn = {0895-3309},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.31.2.211},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {Following the 2016 US presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories (``fake news''), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: 1) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their ``most important'' source; 2) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; 3) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and 4) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/jep.31.2.211.pdf}
}

@article{autorImportingPoliticalPolarization2020,
  title = {Importing {{Political Polarization}}? {{The Electoral Consequences}} of {{Rising Trade Exposure}}},
  shorttitle = {Importing {{Political Polarization}}?},
  author = {Autor, David and Dorn, David and Hanson, Gordon and Majlesi, Kaveh},
  year = {2020},
  month = oct,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {110},
  number = {10},
  pages = {3139--3183},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20170011},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {Has rising import competition contributed to the polarization of US politics? Analyzing multiple measures of political expression and results of congressional and presidential elections spanning the period 2000 through 2016, we find strong though not definitive evidence of an ideological realignment in trade-exposed local labor markets that commences prior to the divisive 2016 US presidential election. Exploiting the exogenous component of rising import competition by China, we find that trade exposed electoral districts simultaneously exhibit growing ideological polarization in some domains, meaning expanding support for both strong-left and strong-right views, and pure rightward shifts in others. Specifically, trade-impacted commuting zones or districts saw an increasing market share for the Fox News channel (a rightward shift), stronger ideological polarization in campaign contributions (a polarized shift), and a relative rise in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress (a rightward shift). Trade-exposed counties with an initial majority White population became more likely to elect a GOP conservative, while trade-exposed counties with an initial majority-minority population became more likely to elect a liberal Democrat, where in both sets of counties, these gains came at the expense of moderate Democrats (a polarized shift). In presidential elections, counties with greater trade exposure shifted toward the Republican candidate (a rightward shift). These results broadly support an emerging political economy literature that connects adverse economic shocks to sharp ideological realignments that cleave along racial and ethnic lines and induce discrete shifts in political preferences and economic policy. (JEL D72, F14, J15, L82, R23)},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/w22637.pdf}
}

@misc{demszkyGoEmotionsDatasetFineGrained2020,
  title = {{{GoEmotions}}: {{A Dataset}} of {{Fine-Grained Emotions}}},
  shorttitle = {{{GoEmotions}}},
  author = {Demszky, Dorottya and {Movshovitz-Attias}, Dana and Ko, Jeongwoo and Cowen, Alan and Nemade, Gaurav and Ravi, Sujith},
  year = {2020},
  month = jun,
  number = {arXiv:2005.00547},
  eprint = {2005.00547},
  primaryclass = {cs},
  publisher = {{arXiv}},
  urldate = {2023-06-09},
  abstract = {Understanding emotion expressed in language has a wide range of applications, from building empathetic chatbots to detecting harmful online behavior. Advancement in this area can be improved using large-scale datasets with a fine-grained typology, adaptable to multiple downstream tasks. We introduce GoEmotions, the largest manually annotated dataset of 58k English Reddit comments, labeled for 27 emotion categories or Neutral. We demonstrate the high quality of the annotations via Principal Preserved Component Analysis. We conduct transfer learning experiments with existing emotion benchmarks to show that our dataset generalizes well to other domains and different emotion taxonomies. Our BERT-based model achieves an average F1-score of .46 across our proposed taxonomy, leaving much room for improvement.},
  archiveprefix = {arxiv},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Computation and Language},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/2005.00547.pdf}
}

@article{duboisEchoChamberOverstated2018,
  title = {The Echo Chamber Is Overstated: The Moderating Effect of Political Interest and Diverse Media},
  shorttitle = {The Echo Chamber Is Overstated},
  author = {Dubois, Elizabeth and Blank, Grant},
  year = {2018},
  month = may,
  journal = {Information, Communication \& Society},
  volume = {21},
  number = {5},
  pages = {729--745},
  issn = {1369-118X, 1468-4462},
  doi = {10.1080/1369118X.2018.1428656},
  urldate = {2023-06-09},
  abstract = {In a high-choice media environment, there are fears that individuals will select media and content that reinforce their existing beliefs and lead to segregation based on interest and/or partisanship. This could lead to partisan echo chambers among those who are politically interested and could contribute to a growing gap in knowledge between those who are politically interested and those who are not. However, the high-choice environment also allows individuals, including those who are politically interested, to consume a wide variety of media, which could lead them to more diverse content and perspectives. This study examines the relationship between political interest as well as media diversity and being caught in an echo chamber (measured by five different variables). Using a nationally representative survey of adult internet users in the United Kingdom (N = 2000), we find that those who are interested in politics and those with diverse media diets tend to avoid echo chambers. This work challenges the impact of echo chambers and tempers fears of partisan segregation since only a small segment of the population are likely to find themselves in an echo chamber. We argue that single media studies and studies which use narrow definitions and measurements of being in an echo chamber are flawed because they do not test the theory in the realistic context of a multiple media environment.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/The echo chamber is overstated the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media.pdf}
}

@article{flaxmanFilterBubblesEcho2016,
  title = {Filter {{Bubbles}}, {{Echo Chambers}}, and {{Online News Consumption}}},
  author = {Flaxman, Seth and Goel, Sharad and Rao, Justin M.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  volume = {80},
  number = {S1},
  pages = {298--320},
  issn = {0033-362X, 1537-5331},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfw006},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {Online publishing, social networks, and web search have dramatically lowered the costs of producing, distributing, and discovering news articles. Some scholars argue that such technological changes increase exposure to diverse perspectives, while others worry that they increase ideological segregation. We address the issue by examining webbrowsing histories for 50,000 US-located users who regularly read online news. We find that social networks and search engines are associated with an increase in the mean ideological distance between individuals. However, somewhat counterintuitively, these same channels also are associated with an increase in an individual's exposure to material from his or her less preferred side of the political spectrum. Finally, the vast majority of online news consumption is accounted for by individuals simply visiting the home pages of their favorite, typically mainstream, news outlets, tempering the consequences\textemdash both positive and negative\textemdash of recent technological changes. We thus uncover evidence for both sides of the debate, while also finding that the magnitude of the effects is relatively modest.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/bubbles.pdf}
}

@article{grahamMoralStereotypesLiberals2012,
  title = {The {{Moral Stereotypes}} of {{Liberals}} and {{Conservatives}}: {{Exaggeration}} of {{Differences}} across the {{Political Spectrum}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Moral Stereotypes}} of {{Liberals}} and {{Conservatives}}},
  author = {Graham, Jesse and Nosek, Brian A. and Haidt, Jonathan},
  editor = {Young, Liane},
  year = {2012},
  month = dec,
  journal = {PLoS ONE},
  volume = {7},
  number = {12},
  pages = {e50092},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0050092},
  urldate = {2023-06-09},
  abstract = {We investigated the moral stereotypes political liberals and conservatives have of themselves and each other. In reality, liberals endorse the individual-focused moral concerns of compassion and fairness more than conservatives do, and conservatives endorse the group-focused moral concerns of ingroup loyalty, respect for authorities and traditions, and physical/spiritual purity more than liberals do. 2,212 U.S. participants filled out the Moral Foundations Questionnaire with their own answers, or as a typical liberal or conservative would answer. Across the political spectrum, moral stereotypes about ``typical'' liberals and conservatives correctly reflected the direction of actual differences in foundation endorsement but exaggerated the magnitude of these differences. Contrary to common theories of stereotyping, the moral stereotypes were not simple underestimations of the political outgroup's morality. Both liberals and conservatives exaggerated the ideological extremity of moral concerns for the ingroup as well as the outgroup. Liberals were least accurate about both groups.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/graham2012.pdf}
}

@article{guessAlmostEverythingModeration2021,
  title = {({{Almost}}) {{Everything}} in {{Moderation}}: {{New Evidence}} on {{Americans}}' {{Online Media Diets}}},
  shorttitle = {({{Almost}}) {{Everything}} in {{Moderation}}},
  author = {Guess, Andrew M.},
  year = {2021},
  month = oct,
  journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {65},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1007--1022},
  issn = {0092-5853, 1540-5907},
  doi = {10.1111/ajps.12589},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {Does the internet facilitate selective exposure to politically congenial content? To answer this question, I introduce and validate large-N behavioral data on Americans' online media consumption in both 2015 and 2016. I then construct a simple measure of media diet slant and use machine classification to identify individual articles related to news about politics. I find that most people across the political spectrum have relatively moderate media diets, about a quarter of which consist of mainstream news websites and portals. Quantifying the similarity of Democrats' and Republicans' media diets, I find nearly 65\% overlap in the two groups' distributions in 2015 and roughly 50\% in 2016. An exception to this picture is a small group of partisans who drive a disproportionate amount of traffic to ideologically slanted websites. If online ``echo chambers'' exist, they are a reality for relatively few people who may nonetheless exert disproportionate influence and visibility.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/guess2021.pdf}
}

@misc{jensenDataMining5772023,
  title = {Data {{Mining}} 577: {{Political Polarization Source Code}}},
  author = {Jensen, Matt},
  year = {2023},
  publisher = {{https://github.com/publicmatt/data\_mining\_577}}
}

@misc{jensenDataMining5772023a,
  title = {Data {{Mining}} 577: {{Political Polarization Data}}},
  author = {Jensen, Matt},
  year = {2023}
}

@article{priorMediaPoliticalPolarization2013,
  title = {Media and {{Political Polarization}}},
  author = {Prior, Markus},
  year = {2013},
  month = may,
  journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {101--127},
  issn = {1094-2939, 1545-1577},
  doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242},
  urldate = {2023-06-06},
  abstract = {This article examines if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates. Congress and some newer media outlets have added more partisan messages to a continuing supply of mostly centrist news. Although political attitudes of most Americans have remained fairly moderate, evidence points to some polarization among the politically involved. Proliferation of media choices lowered the share of less interested, less partisan voters and thereby made elections more partisan. But evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors is mixed at best. Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences. Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential, segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/Zotero/storage/SFKISRT9/Prior - 2013 - Media and Political Polarization.pdf}
}

@article{stewartPolarizationRisingInequality2020,
  title = {Polarization under Rising Inequality and Economic Decline},
  author = {Stewart, Alexander J. and McCarty, Nolan and Bryson, Joanna J.},
  year = {2020},
  month = dec,
  journal = {Science Advances},
  volume = {6},
  number = {50},
  pages = {eabd4201},
  issn = {2375-2548},
  doi = {10.1126/sciadv.abd4201},
  urldate = {2023-05-16},
  abstract = {Polarization can spread and become entrenched when inequality creates subpopulations that cannot afford risks.           ,              Social and political polarization is an important source of conflict in many societies. Understanding its causes has become a priority of scholars across disciplines. We demonstrate that shifts in socialization strategies analogous to political polarization can arise as a locally beneficial response to both rising wealth inequality and economic decline. In many contexts, interaction with diverse out-groups confers benefits from innovation and exploration greater than those that arise from interacting exclusively with a homogeneous in-group. However, when the economic environment favors risk aversion, a strategy of seeking lower-risk in-group interactions can be important to maintaining individual solvency. Our model shows that under conditions of economic decline or increasing inequality, some members of the population benefit from adopting a risk-averse, in-group favoring strategy. Moreover, we show that such in-group polarization can spread rapidly to the whole population and persist even when the conditions that produced it have reversed.},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/Zotero/storage/ZJXIIIBC/Stewart et al. - 2020 - Polarization under rising inequality and economic .pdf}
}

@inproceedings{zhuMultidimensionalPoliticalSpectrum2009,
  title = {Multidimensional Political Spectrum Identification and Analysis},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 18th {{ACM}} Conference on {{Information}} and Knowledge Management},
  author = {Zhu, Leilei and Mitra, Prasenjit},
  year = {2009},
  month = nov,
  pages = {2045--2048},
  publisher = {{ACM}},
  address = {{Hong Kong China}},
  doi = {10.1145/1645953.1646297},
  urldate = {2023-06-09},
  abstract = {In this work, we show the importance of multidimensional opinion representation in the political context combining domain knowledge and results from principal component analysis. We discuss the differences of feature selection between political spectrum analysis and normal opinion mining tasks. We build regression models on each opinion dimension for scoring and placing new opinion entities, e.g. personal blogs or politicians, onto the political opinion spectrum. We apply our methods on the floor statement records of the United States Senate and evaluate it against the uni-dimensional representation of political opinion space. The experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed model in explaining the voting records of the Senate.},
  isbn = {978-1-60558-512-3},
  langid = {english},
  file = {/home/user/577/repo/docs/references/zhu2009.pdf}
}
